Negotiating with a divided Iran is no good

It’s impossible to really understand Iran’s diplomatic policy without first understanding its internal politics. But some observers are skipping that crucial step as they search for ways to end the deadlock over Iran’s nuclear program.

In one recent story at The Diplomat, Richard Dreyfuss takes a relatively nuanced look at the possibilities for discussion:

It’s not easy reading the tea leaves in Tehran, especially when it comes to Iran’s controversial nuclear programme. But over the past few weeks, Iran has sent out a steady stream of signals that it’s willing to talk, and they’ve put some fairly specific proposals on the table.

It’s possible to argue about every one of them, and as always dealing with Iran’s belligerency and fractured internal politics makes it daunting to even the most optimistic among the diplomacy-minded. Still, something important seems to be happening. And, so far at least, the United States hasn’t responded at all to Iran’s overtures, except with bombastic rhetoric of its own.

Paul Pillar can’t even be bothered to mention anything about Iran’s politics in a recent blog post, though. True to his old-school CIA background, he chooses to ignore the internal dynamics of Iran and focus only on American politics:

There has been no exploration jointly with the Iranians, and almost none unilaterally in U.S. policy discourse, of possible safeguards of an Iranian program that would include the enrichment of uranium. There are all manner of inspections, on-site monitoring, and other procedural arrangements that could be explored to determine if they might form the basis of an agreement that would meet the minimum needs of both sides. But the exploration has never occurred. All we have on the U.S. side are some mutterings by the secretary of state about how maybe, possibly, someday Iran could be entrusted with an enrichment program. The western stance of no enrichment, coupled with a political environment in the United States in which Iran is demonized and anything that could be interpreted as a favorable gesture toward the Islamic Republic is politically dangerous, has so far preempted any moves to fill the gap.

Well, the political environment in Iran demonizes the U.S. a whole lot more than the other way around. No talk of that interfering with a deal, huh?

An equally important omission is the seismic power dispute between Iran’s political organs. Ayatollah Khamenei, the hardline clerics, and the Revolutionary Guards decided after the 2009 presidential election that even what limited measures of democracy Iran had were a threat to the survival of the regime. These actors decided to consolidate power away from Iran’s “elected” leader, President Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad has had his wings clipped in a number of ways by Khamenei — he has had cabinet members and chief of staff arrested by the Supreme Leader, been accused of “witchcraft,” and threatened with impeachment.

In the latest sign that Ahmadinejad’s policy does not reflect the IRGC’s will, one need not look further than the idea — proposed by the U.S., Paul Pillar — of a “hotline” between Washington and Tehran, similar to the “red telephone” used during the Cold War. Ahmadinejad spoke favorably of such a system, only to be rebuffed by his own defense minister — a former IRGC commander, and thus a more likely person to speak for the Iranian security establishment.