The next step in our Iran policy

Talk of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities is springing up again, on the heels of two major developments: one is an an IAEA report on the progress of the nuclear program, and the other is a column by Israeli journalist Nahum Barnea outlining the debate in Israel’s security establishment over whether to attack.

This has forced the question in Washington: What is the next step once our current prevention strategy runs its course? I am still skeptical that the military option will be exercised anytime soon, despite all the recent chatter. One thing we learned as a result of the debate in Israel is that a number of crucial political and military figures are opposed to an attack at this stage. These include IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, the heads of the Mossad and Shabak (Israel’s internal security service), influential members of Knesset Moshe Ya’alon and Shaul Mofaz (who have both served as defense minister and IDF Chief of Staff), Intelligence Minister Dan Meridor, and even Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. Also importantly, President Barack Obama is opposed.

One answer which I have previously rejected may be a better option due to changed circumstances. That option is the “naming and shaming” route, to aggressively wage a “PR war” against Iran’s systemic human rights abuses and illegal clandestine operations.

These circumstances have changed somewhat. With the quantum of credibility that the Obama Administration has received on human rights as a result of the Arab Spring, Iranian allegations of American hypocrisy sound less credible. (Note to realists and conservatives: This is what is known as soft power.)

Russia and China will still refuse to endorse the language of Europe and the U.S., but they must now be more cautious not to tread on Arab popular sentiment. For the first time, their insistence on “non-interference” could draw political costs. Arab rulers have discovered that they cannot make policy completely independent of Arab public opinion. Soon, other countries will, too.

This is why it would have been strategic folly to have backed Mubarak to a bitter end. And it is why Saudi Arabia’s backing of the repression in Bahrain was foolish. Building resonance with an angry Arab public is undermined by such short-sighted duplicity. (It has also had the effect of pushing some Bahraini Shia to align closer with Iran than they did before.)

Going the quasi-humanitarian route on Iran is not guaranteed to work, but it is an option that U.S. could not have exercised as easily a year ago. It also helps maximize our gains in the war of narratives with Iran, putting us in better position to influence affairs throughout the region. As long as we do not initiate military action (in the foreseeable future), those gains could mean a whole lot for American foreign policy.