The false hope of Iranian revolution

Nader Mousavizadeh, a former aide to Kofi Annan and a senior fellow at the IISS in London, tries to make the case that a new Iranian revolution will undercut the need for a new sanctions regime:

If deeper sanctions in the first instance will be seen as a lifeline by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad (allowing them to appeal to nationalist sentiment and tighten their grip on the economy), an actual agreement—blessed by the U.N. Security Council—will enable the leadership to claim victory without actually impeding its repressive rule.

There are many things wrong with this. First of all, sanctions would not be a lifeline to the regime—quite the opposite. Past rounds of sanctions have not altered the calculus of the government, but they have exposed the government to domestic criticism unusual for the regime.

Second, “an actual agreement” is our objective, isn’t it? It is far too dangerous to make regime change our short-term objective in Iran.

This leads to my third point, that even when Mousavizadeh says “regime change is under way,” this is misleading. Yes, regime change is under way. But it is not imminent. And it may very well not happen at all if the regime gets its hands on a nuke within a few years; acquisition of a nuke would totally insulate Iran from international pressure.

Lastly, witness Mousavizadeh’s support for three contradictory claims: 1) that Iran does not desire a nuclear agreement, 2) that the Iranian regime feels squeezed by a coming revolution, and 3) that an agreement would give a new credibility and life to the regime. How, if claims 2) and 3) are true, is 1) also true? Why would the regime decide not to pursue an agreement if it would ensure the regime’s survival?