Nukes, huh? What are they good for?

I understand and agree with the argument that the U.S. needs nuclear weapons. What I don’t get is the idea, as Adam Lowther argues in The National Interest, that we need more nukes. Not only does he argue against decreasing our stockpile, he also wants an increased role for nukes in American foreign policy. He criticizes the idea of “minimum deterrence,” or the idea that the U.S. should only deploy as many nukes as necessary to prevent a nuclear attack from another country. And lastly, he looks favorably upon Dwight Eisenhower’s “New Look” foreign policy, which tried to use nukes as the backbone of American defense — mostly as a way of saving money that would have otherwise been spent on costly conventional programs.

Before anything else, advocating an enhanced role of nuclear weapons in American foreign policy requires that this move would be effective in accomplishing our policy objectives. To support the idea that nukes can do that, Lowther invokes Eisenhower’s New Look, albeit with caveats:

The policy was successful in defending American sovereignty and vital interests. Where it fell short was in limited-war scenarios. In several instances the Soviets acted aggressively in places where the United States had little or no interests. However, it was never designed to solve every possible strategic challenge.

But there’s no elaboration. In what instances did Eisenhower’s New Look, as opposed to a different American doctrine, save American vital interests? The New Look didn’t impact any of Eisenhower’s major foreign policy issues (forging an armistice in Korea, CIA-led rebellions in Iran and Guatemala, The Suez Crisis, Castro’s takeover of Cuba, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and the 1958 intervention in Lebanon, among others). If Lowther’s referring to Eisenhower’s relations among great powers as a “success story” of the New Look, I wonder why other presidents were able to accomplish similar or better results than Ike did with less aggressive nuclear stances.

Nuclear weapons are useful in deterring other nuclear attacks. They also discourage war between nuclear powers — even limited wars. But beyond that, their existence is mostly insignificant to American security policy.

This leads to the second main issue, which is whether America can cull the security benefits of nuclear weapons with a given number of nukes. Lowther does make one fair critique of minimum deterrence in its purest form, which is that the minimum deterrence applies only to deterring an attack on the U.S., but not necessarily the countries under America’s nuclear umbrella. I agree with his point, that the effects on our alliances should be taken into consideration when determining the right number of weapons for our stockpile.

However, even after those alliance effects are considered, it becomes obvious that our current stockpile of 851 active “launchers” is excessive. (That number drops to 700 by 2018 under New START.) A recent academic paper, which Lowther obliquely references, advocates a U.S. nuclear force composed of only 311 launchers — 12 nuclear submarines each carrying 24 ballistic missiles, 100 ICBMs in hardened silos across the U.S., and 19 nuclear-armed B-2 stealth bombers. Lowther comments,

Should America continue down a path toward a nuclear arsenal with 311 strategically deployed nuclear warheads, the nation will not have the required credibility to assure allies and deter adversaries. Those who seek to maintain some vague “minimum deterrence” will send the wrong signal to those who matter.

Really? Twelve undetectable nuclear submarines each capable of obliterating Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, or Tehran in 30 minutes is not enough to assure our allies? It would be nice if he had some evidence to back up this lofty claim.

On the contrary, rather than sending the “wrong signal,” reducing our nuclear stockpile to a minimum level would send all the right messages. China and India will grow in stature over the coming decades, and Russia will increasingly rely psychologically on nukes for security as its population (and military) shrinks. A new nuclear arms race is precisely what the 21st century does not need.